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 Abstract. Active network technology enables fast deployment of new 
network services tailored to the specific needs of end users, among others 
features. Nevertheless proper charging for these new added value services 
require suitable authentication and authorization mechanisms. In this 
article we describe a security architecture for SARA (Simple Active Router-
Assistant) architecture, an active network platform deployed in the context 
of the IST-GCAP project. The proposed solution provides all the required 
security features, and it also grants proper scalability of the overall system, 
by using a distributed key-generation algorithm. 
1. Introduction 
Network services provision versatility has been dramatically improved by the 
introduction of active networking [1]. This technology provides network nodes with 
dynamic programmability capabilities, enabling the provision of customized services 
in a per customer basis, thus allowing clients to select specific services to be used 
when coursing its traffic. Since these services provide an added value to the users and 
its provision can imply additional costs to the operator, new charging mechanisms 
compatibles with this new service dynamic must be deployed as well. This charging 
mechanisms need that proper authentication and authorization guarantees be provided 
by the active network security architecture. However, heavy security can preclude 
deployment in real scenarios because of the imposed overhead in terms of processing, 
bandwidth and/or latency. So, in order to achieve a deployable active network 
architecture, the security solution must not only provide the guarantees needed for the 
charging system but it must also grant the scalability of the system. In this article, we 
will present the authentication and authorization mechanisms needed to provide an 
suitable charging system for active networks based on the SARA platform which can 
fulfill both requirements thanks to a distributed key-generation algorithm and to 
architectural features of the SARA platform.  
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows: in section 2 an introduction to 
SARA is presented, along with a description of its active packet exchanges. In section 
3, the security solution requirements are detailed, including threats assessment and 
scalability requirements. Next, in section 4, the security architecture is described. In 
section 5, related work is presented and finally, section 6 is devoted to conclusions. 
2. About Active Networks 
There is clear trend towards extending the set of functions that network routers 
support beyond the traditional forwarding service. Active network technology aims to 
allow intermediate routers to perform computations up to the application layer and 
therefore making network more intelligent. Besides, this technology supports the 
deployment and execution on-the-fly of new active services, wi thout interrupting the 
network operation. In this way, an active network is in the position to offer 
dynamically customized network services to customers/users. 
This dynamic network programmability can be conceived by two different 
approaches. Some active networks platforms follow a discrete approach. This mean, 
packets don’t include the code to be executed in the active routers, but exist a separate 
mechanism for injecting programs intro an active router. Usually this download is 
done from a server code or other system with the responsibility of storing the code. 
Others follow a integrated approach, and packets (called capsules) include not only 
user data but the code for the forwarding of the own packet as well. This code is then 
executed at the routers, or switches, as the packet propagates through the network. 
Potential advantages of active networking include the opening up of the network to 
third parties, the easy introduction of sophisticated and unanticipated network 
services, and significant speedups in the deployment of such services. 
2.1. About SARA 
SARA (Simple Active Router Assistant) [2] is an active router prototype developed in 
the context of the IST project GCAP [3]. It is based on the router-assistant paradigm, 
meaning that active code does not run directly on the router processor but on a 
different device, called assistant, which is directly attached to the router through a 
high-speed LAN. Hence, the router only has to identify and divert active packets to its 
assistant. Active packets are identified by the router alert option, enabling active 
router location transparency, since active packets need not to be addressed to the 
active router in order to be processed by it. After requested processing is performed 
by the assistant, the packets are returned to the router in order to be forwarded. The 
active code needed to process active packets is dynamically downloaded from Code 
Servers when it is not locally available in the assistant. In this way safety is checked 
in advance, since only registered harmless-proofed code is allowed to run on the 
network. Thus the presumed target scenario is one in which a central administration 
provides active services loaded on the fly from a choice of known applications that 
have been provided by the customer or network manager.  
  
 
SARA is available in two platforms: One fully based on linux [2] (playing both 
roles: router and assistant as a development scenario) and a hybrid platform where the 
router used is an Ericsson-Telebit AXI462 running a kernel adapted to work with an 
active assistant. 
 
2.1.1. SARA Packet Exchanges 
 
We will next introduce the packet exchanges performed, so we can detect the 
authentication and authorization requirements. 
2.1.1.1. Elements involved in the packet exchange 
Source: User terminal that generates traffic and uses the active features of the 
network. 
Destination: It is the terminal that Source addresses its traffic to. 
Active network operator: provides network services and additional active services. 
There are two main elements in the active network: 
Active Router: It is an active router (router plus assistant) capable of processing 
active packets. It is also able of obtaining the active code needed. 
Code Server: It is the active code repository that serves the Active routers. 
2.1.1.2. Packet exchange description 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Source needs special active processing for a flow of packets between itself and 
Destination, it must send packets (ACT[1] in the Figure 1), addressed to Destination, 
containing the Router Alert option and the identification of the active code that it 
desires to be executed. When this packet reaches the first Active Router, it is inspected 
and the identification of the active code is extracted. If the Active Code is locally 
available at the Active Router, it performs the requested process and then forwards the 
packet (ACT[2] in the Figure 1). If the needed active code is not locally available the 
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Active Router requests it to the Code Server (CORREQ in the Figure 1). The Code 
Server then sends the requested code to the Active Router ([COD] in the Figure 1), 
which now processes the packet and forwards it to the next hop. The same procedure 
is executed by all the Active Routers along the path, until the packet reaches 
Destination, where the packet is received. Next active packets of this flow will 
presumably follow the same path, so the Active Routers will be capable of processing 
them without needing to request the code from Code Servers again. 
3. Security Architecture Requirements 
In this section we will present the different requirements imposed to the security 
architecture. Charging system imposes the need for authentication and authorizations 
of , i.e. it must be possible to verify that the user that is requesting the code (Source) 
is authorized to executing it at this moment. In addition, the service request must be 
provided in a non repudiable fashion, since it is considered as an asset when charging 
is involved. However, it must be noted that non repudiation features are usually 
expensive, because they require the usage of public key cryptography. Besides, other 
security issues impose additional requirements that will be presented next. Finally we 
will describe other general requirements, specially emphasizing in scalability aspects 
that also have great impact in the final solution. 
3.1. Additional Security Requirements 
In order to perform an exhaustive analysis, we will retrieve the security requirements 
from each elements´ perspective. 
From the Active Router´s perspective, it is relevant that the active code loaded into 
the routers is provided by an authorized Code Server and not from an unauthorized 
one. Besides, the code integrity must be preserved while it is transmitted from the 
Code Server to the Active Router.  
From the Code Server´s perspective, it must be able to authenticate Active Routers 
that are requesting active code, since not all the code will be available to all routers. 
Furthermore, the security solution must provide confidential code transfer, in order to 
prevent unauthorized parts to inspect the delivered code.  
From the Source´s perspective, it must be able to be certain no other user is 
requesting active services on its behalf, so that it is only charged for the services that 
it has requested. It must also be the only one capable to control its active services, 
meaning that no other user is capable of introduce new active packets or modify 
active packets sent by Source, interfering with the requested active services. 
 From the Destination´s perspective, there are no requirements since it does not 
demand active services from the network, it just receives packets sent using them. In 
case that Destination would be interest in answering this packets using also active 
services, it would become Source and Source´s requirements would apply. It should 
be noted that end-to-end security is out of the scope of this security solution.  
 
  
 
3.2. Other General Requirements 
Zero user knowledge at the Active Routers: In order to build a manageable 
solution, user management must not be performed on each and every Active Router. A 
central database containing all the users information, including access rights would be 
the preferred solution. 
 
Active Router transparency: It must not be required that Source  be aware of which 
Active Routers are in the path used by the network to transport packet towards 
destination. This means that active packets sent by Source  must not be dependent of 
which Active Routers are addressed to.  
 
4. Security Architecture 
4.1. Source Authorization 
4.1.1. Authorization Paradigm 
The key feature that must be provided by the security architecture is authorization 
i.e. Sources must be authorized to execute the solicited code on Active Routers. There 
are two authorization paradigms that can be used: authorization based in access 
control lists or authorization based in credentials. The first paradigm is based on the 
existence of an access control list (locally available or in a remote location) that must 
be queried every time an Active Router receives an active packet sent by Source , in 
order to validate the Source´s permissions. In this case the identity of requesting part 
must be authenticated in order to prevent impersonation. This approach then requires 
that the requested device (Active Router) has information about Sources and 
permissions or it imposes a communication with an authorization server every time a 
Source sends an active packet. The second paradigm demands that every time Source 
sends a packets, a credential that proves the Source´s permissions must be presented. 
Then the requested device (Active Router) only needs to verify the credential. 
However, credential generation and distribution may be more than a trivial task.  
The solution proposed in this paper will be designed based on the second 
paradigm, since we consider that it provides better scalability attributes. Note that 
since the access control list can not reside on every Active Router, because of the Zero 
user knowledge requirement, it must reside in a remote location, imposing a remote 
query every time a Source need to be authorized. 
 
4.1.2. Public Key Cryptography vs. Symmetric Key Cryptography 
In order to allow the intended use, a credential must contain verifiable 
authorization information i.e. the permissions granted to the holder of the credential. 
Besides, it must be possible to verify that the issuer of the credential has the authority 
to grant these permissions, (it will be called a valid issuer). It is also critical to 
  
 
validate that the user that is presenting the credential is the same user that the 
credential was granted to.  
In order to fulfill the above stated characteristics of a credential, public key 
encryption can be used. So, a credential containing the Source´s permission and the 
Source´s public key is signed with the private key of the valid issuer. Then, the Active 
Router must be capable of verifying the authenticity of the credential, using the valid 
issuer public key, and also it must be capable of verifying that the requesting user has 
the private key that corresponds to the public key included in the credential. Even 
though this mechanism provides all the required features, the usage of public key 
cryptography is very demanding in term of processing, specially when considering 
that for every active packet, two public key signatures must be verified. 
In order to obtain a less demanding solution, symmetric key cryptography can be 
used. However, building a similar system using symmetric key would require the 
usage of two different symmetric keys (a first one shared by the valid issuer and the 
Active Routers and another key shared by Source  and the Active Routers). This system 
would still demand for two signature verifications and it would present the additional 
problem of key distribution. So, in order to improve the scalability of the solution, we 
will next explore the possibility of using only one symmetric key, shared by the valid 
issuer, Source  and the Active Routers. 
The requirements imposed to this key are: 
? Different keys for different Sources. (i.e. the key must be linked to a Source) 
? Different keys for the same Source at different moments (i.e. the key must have a 
validity period) 
? Different keys for different active codes by the same Source (i.e. the key must be 
linked to a service) 
So, the key issued by the valid issuer is linked to a Source, a code and a validity 
period.  
Then, if this key is used to sign (HMAC [4] signature) an active packet that request 
the execution of a particular active code, the active packet itself plays the role of a 
credential. Basically, an Active Router receives a signed active packet that includes 
the requested code identification, the Source and the time when the active packet was 
generated. Then if the Active Router has a valid key linked to the Source and the 
requested code, it can verify the authenticity of the active packet, without any further 
information. This mechanism imposes the usage of an Authorization Server (the valid 
issuer role), that generates the keys. So, in order to execute a code in the network, 
Source must obtain the correspondent key from the Authorization Server in a secure 
way. This is not a time critical task, since it is only performed when the service is 
requested and it is possible to execute it in advance . However, once the service is 
authorized and the key is generated, the Authorization Server must communicate it to 
all Active Routers in the network, so they are aware of the new authorization. This is 
does not seems to be the most scalable solution, because of the amount of 
communications needed between the Authorization Server and the Active Routers.  
 
We will next present an improved solution that minimizes the required interaction 
between this elements. The basic idea is that the key can be almost autonomously 
generated in every Active Router when it is needed. In order to achieve this, we will 
associate a key to every Active Code that can be loaded in the Active Routers. The 
  
 
key associated with active code Ci is called Kci. These keys are known by the Code 
Server and by the Authorization Server. Then, when a Source  S requests authorization 
for the execution of code Ci at a moment T and for a period P, the Authorization 
Server generates the key K as the HMAC of the concatenation of Kci, S, T and P. The 
key K is then transmitted to the Source, so it can sign the active packet with it. If we 
analyze the characteristics of K we can see that: K is linked to an active code (Kci); K 
is linked to a Source(S); K has a validity period (T, T+P); K can not be generated by 
any Source, since they do not have Kci. However, if the Code server confidentially 
transmits the active code [COD] it also attaches Kci, then the Active Routers are 
capable of regenerating K without contacting the Authorization Server every time an 
active packet arrives or when a new Source requests an already downloaded code. 
The Active Routers have all the information needed to generate K, i.e. S, T, P and Ci 
are included in the service request and Kci is obtained when they download the code 
from de Code Server. Note that the solution is based on shared secret keys, so the 
security level of the solution can be defined by setting the number of parts share the 
keys Kci (authorized Active Routers for a given code Ci) and the frequency Kci are 
changed. 
4.2. Code Downloading 
Another key feature that must also be provided is a secure way to download code 
(and keys Kci) from the Code Server into the Active Routers. However, this is not as 
time critical as user authorization since it is only performed once, when the first 
packet arrives. The following packets will benefit from a cached copy of the code and 
the Kci. So, a protocol that allows a secure communication between two parts is 
needed. We will use TLS [5] since it provides all the needed features. However, the 
usage a new protocol specifically designed for this task would result in improved 
efficiency, since TLS is a generic protocol. Then the Code Server must have a digital 
certificate (public key cryptography is used), and a TLS session is established 
between the Code Server and the Active Router, before the code is downloaded. The 
Active Router does not need a digital certificate, since non repudiation features are not 
required. Its authentication can be performed using a user and password, transmitted 
through the TLS session.  
 4.3. Non Repudiation 
Since charging is involved when the user requests a service non repudiation 
features must be provided. In order to assure non repudiation, public key 
cryptography must be used when the user request authorization to the Authorization 
Server, as it will be described in the following section. However, our solution will not 
use public key cryptography in the credentials because of performance issues. 
Summarizing, the proposed solution provides non repudiation features when the 
service is requested to the Authorization Server, but it does not provides them when 
active packets are processed by Active Routers; this is tradeoff between performance 
and security features that we consider acceptable for most scenarios.  
  
 
4.4. The Security Solution: Step by Step 
In this section we will describe the complete mechanism which is illustrated in 
figure 2. 
First (step 1 in figure 2) , Source  requests authorization (to the Authorization 
Server) to execute an active code Ci in the network. This request is done in a secure 
way, meaning that public key cryptography and digital certificates are used by both 
parts. So, Source´s request is signed with the private key of Source and its digital 
certificate is also included. This request is encrypted with the public key of the 
Authorization Server. Then the Authorization Server after receiving and verifying the 
request, it generates K as the HMAC of the Source´s identification (S), the key 
associated to the requested code (Kci), the moment of the request (T) and the validity 
period requested by Source (P). Then the Authorization Server sends a signed 
message containing K. The message is encrypted with the public key of Source . At 
this moment, the Authorization Server has all the needed information for charging, 
since it has the requested service, the user, authenticated in a non repudiable way, and 
the time that this service was requested. 
Source decrypts the message and obtains K. Then (step 2 in figure 2), it generates 
active packets , that includes its own identification S, the moment of the request T, the 
validity period P and an identifier of the solicited active code Ci. This message is 
signed performing a HMAC of the message plus K. 
When an Active Router receives active packets, it first verifies that the packet is not 
obsolete, i.e. it is within the validity period and then it verifies the solicited active 
code availability. In case the code (and Kci) is not locally available, it downloads it, 
using a secure (TLS) connection from the Code Server (step 3 in figure 2). Then the 
Active Router generates K, using S, T and P extracted from the packet and Kci 
obtained from the Code Server when the code was downloaded. If the HMAC 
signature is verified, it means that Source has been authorized to execute the 
requested code, so it processes the packet using the solicited code and forwards it to 
the next hop. The same procedure is repeated on every Active Router along the path 
until the packet reaches Destination. The following active packets of the flow will 
benefit from cached copies of the active code and Kci in every Active Router.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2. Key Distribution. 
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5. Related Work 
There are many proposals for charging and accounting in a Multiservice Network 
[6], but few works have addressed the problem of the security mechanisms related to 
charging. One of these proposals has been done in the context of the CATI project 
[7].This IST project aims to investigate mechanisms of charging based on accounting 
QoS-based end-to-end communications. In CATI is proposed a security architecture 
for a scenario of multiple ISPs, an E-Commerce Service Provider, a customer, and a 
payment provider. 
On the other hand, some proposals consider charging and accounting as an active 
application more. AIACE[8] and PEACH [9] explore the idea of using active services 
in order to enable charging and accounting system more scalable and flexible. In 
AIACE accounting active services are loaded on-the-fly and perform accounting tasks 
on behalf of accounting servers. PEACH is similar in many aspects to AIACE but 
focus more on the fast change in charging logic to reflects changes in business 
policies. 
But to the best of our knowledge, FAIN [10] is the only active network platform 
previous to SARA that considers the charging for the use of active services. However, 
the scope of FAIN security architecture is limited mainly to protecting Active 
Network infrastructure from users and active code. 
6. Conclusions 
We have presented a security solution that provides authentication and 
authorization services for active networks based on the SARA platform. These 
features allow proper charging for active services. Futhermore, the solution 
performance is guaranteed by the usage of symmetric key cryptography. The 
scalability of the solution is assured by the authorization model, based on credentials, 
and the key distribution mechanism, that minimizes key exchanges by allowing key 
generation at every Active Router in an autonomous fashion. The security level of the 
solution is determined by the re-keying frequency i.e. how often Kci are changed. 
Then, we conclude that this solution enables the deployment charging mechanisms for 
SARA in a public testbed. Finally, it should be noted that it is possible to extend this 
architecture to other active network platforms as long as a central active code 
repository exists in the other platform.  
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